UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/26718
10 November 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 9 NOVEMBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ITALY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit a letter dated 9 November 1993 addressed to you by the Hon. Mario Raffaelli, Chairman of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Minsk Conference on Nagorny Karabakh.

I would appreciate it if the letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) F. Paolo FULCI
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 9 November 1993 from the Chairman-in-Office of the Minsk Conference on Nagorny Karabakh addressed to the President of the Security Council

Enclosed please find:

(a) The text of a declaration approved in Vienna by the nine countries of the CSCE Minsk Group on Nagorny Karabakh, concerning the latest developments in the conflict on the ground;

(b) The package proposal worked out by the same nine countries and submitted to the parties to the conflict as a result of the meeting of the Minsk Group from 2 to 8 November 1993.

I shall keep you informed of further developments concerning the efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

(Signed) Mario RAFFAELLI
Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE Minsk
Conference on Nagorny Karabakh

Enclosure I

Declaration of the Nine

The nine Minsk Group countries - Germany, United States of America, Belarus, France, Italy, Russian Federation, Sweden, Czech Republic and Turkey - vigorously condemn the behaviour of the parties to the recent hostilities in the Nagorny Karabakh conflict during the most recent cease-fire violation and the seizure of additional territory by force.

These actions constitute unacceptable violations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) principle of non-use of force and undercut the efforts of the international community to find a peaceful solution to this conflict. Those responsible for these events have added to the suffering of their own people.

The nine countries also condemn the looting, burning and destruction of villages and towns, which cannot be justified under any standards of civilized behaviour. No acquisition of territory by force can be recognized, and the occupation of territory cannot be used to obtain international recognition or to impose a change of legal status.

The Nine request the unilateral withdrawal of occupying forces from the areas of Goradiz and Zangelan and the immediate restoration and prolongation of the cease-fire which was broken.

They insist on the acceptance of their proposed timetable providing for a full and permanent cease-fire, withdrawals from occupied territories and the dispatching of a monitor mission, leading to the early convening of the Minsk Conference. Acceptance of this timetable (called for by United Nations Security Council resolution 874 (1993)) is essential to implement United Nations Security Council resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993) and 874 (1993), which should all be fully complied with. All issues not dealt with in the timetable, including the status of Nagorny Karabakh, will be decided through negotiations at the Minsk Conference.

The Nine expect the leaders of all the parties to express specific, clear-cut assurances of their readiness to refrain from the use of force in the solution of this conflict and to take concrete steps to demonstrate their commitment to the negotiating process, in particular by issuing a unilateral cease-fire declaration and by participating constructively in the Minsk Group negotiations. This would facilitate agreement on the comprehensive proposal of the Nine, early return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes and the steps which will be necessary for people on both sides to survive the winter.

The Nine wish to warn the parties to the conflict that they will be held responsible for cease-fire violations and excesses in the use of force in response to violations. Such behaviour is incompatible with the negotiating process and will be condemned before world opinion. If the leaders of the parties wish to be viewed as responsible authorities, they must act responsibly.

Enclosure II

Package proposal by the nine countries of the Minsk Group on the Nagorny Karabakh conflict, dated 8 November 1993

The package proposal is based on the proposal of the Nine (see S/26522, appendix), amended as follows:

1. Concerning the first preambular paragraph, the present text of the Nine will remain, with the expression "political status" replaced by "legal status".

2. The following sentence will be included in the preamble:

"The opening of the Minsk Conference can in no way be interpreted as implying acceptance or recognition of the situation on the ground. Questions relating to or arising from the conflict and not addressed in the timetable (including withdrawal or displaced persons/refugee questions such as Lachin, Shusha/Shushi, Shahurnian/Garanboy and the enclaves) will remain open and are to be resolved at the Conference."

3. The Preparatory Meeting (taking place before the withdrawal) will deal with all questions concerning the procedure and the decision-making process of the Conference.

4. Withdrawals will be included in the timetable in the following order:

(a) Kubatli (and Zangelan, if withdrawal has not been effected already);

(b) Fizuli (and Goradiz, including the main road along the Iranian border, if withdrawal has not been effected already);

(c) Agdam;

(d) Mardakert;

(e) Djebrail;

(f) Kalbajar.

All withdrawals will take place before the inauguration of the Minsk Conference.

5. The question of Azeri villages allegedly occupied in Kazakh, Zangelan and Nakhichevan will be taken care of by:

(a) An obligation to respect the Azeri-Armenian international border;

(b) Visits by the CSCE Monitor Mission.

6. United Nations Security Council resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993) and 874 (1993) will be attached to the timetable as "essential guidelines".

7. All other clauses agreed in Vienna (such as on refugees, announcements, emergency meetings of the Minsk Group, etc.) will be included.

8. Technical changes recommended by CSCE military experts and other technical changes will be included in the timetable.

All other clauses of the "adjusted timetable" dated 28 September 1993 not affected by the above points are confirmed.

A new version of the timetable based on the above points will be sent to the parties as early as possible.

Parties will be required to reply by 22 November 1993.

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11 November 1993

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Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 822 (1993) of 30 April 1993, 853 (1993) of 29 July 1993 and 874 (1993) of 14 October 1993,

Reaffirming its full support for the peace process being pursued within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and for the tireless efforts of the CSCE Minsk Group,

Taking note of the letter dated 9 November 1993 from the Chairman-in-Office of the Minsk Conference on Nagorny Karabakh addressed to the President of the Security Council and its enclosures (S/26718, annex),

Expressing its serious concern that a continuation of the conflict in and around the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic, and of the tensions between the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijani Republic, would endanger peace and security in the region,

Noting with alarm the escalation in armed hostilities as consequence of the violations of the cease-fire and excesses in the use of force in response to those violations, in particular the occupation of the Zangelan district and the city of Goradiz in the Azerbaijani Republic,

Reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Azerbaijani Republic and of all other States in the region,

Reaffirming also the inviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory,

Expressing grave concern at the latest displacement of a large number of civilians and the humanitarian emergency in the Zangelan district and the city of Goradiz and on Azerbaijan's southern frontier,

1. Condemns the recent violations of the cease-fire established between the parties, which resulted in a resumption of hostilities, and particularly condemns the occupation of the Zangelan district and the city of Goradiz, attacks on civilians and bombardments of the territory of the Azerbaijani Republic;

2. Calls upon the Government of Armenia to use its influence to achieve compliance by the Armenians of the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic with resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993) and 874 (1993), and to ensure that the forces involved are not provided with the means to extend their military campaign further;

3. Welcomes the Declaration of 4 November 1993 of the nine members of the CSCE Minsk Group (S/26718) and commends the proposals contained therein for unilateral cease-fire declarations;

4. Demands from the parties concerned the immediate cessation of armed hostilities and hostile acts, the unilateral withdrawal of occupying forces from the Zangelan district and the city of Goradiz, and the withdrawal of occupying forces from other recently occupied areas of the Azerbaijani Republic in accordance with the "Adjusted timetable of urgent steps to implement Security Council resolutions 822 (1993) and 853 (1993)" (S/26522, appendix) as amended by the CSCE Minsk Group meeting in Vienna of 2 to 8 November 1993;

5. Strongly urges the parties concerned to resume promptly and to make effective and permanent the cease-fire established as a result of the direct contacts undertaken with the assistance of the Government of the Russian Federation in support of the CSCE Minsk Group, and to continue to seek a negotiated settlement of the conflict within the context of the CSCE Minsk process and the "Adjusted timetable" as amended by the CSCE Minsk Group meeting in Vienna of 2 to 8 November 1993;

6. Urges again all States in the region to refrain from any hostile acts and from any interference or intervention, which would lead to the widening of the conflict and undermine peace and security in the region;

7. Requests the Secretary-General and relevant international agencies to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected civilian population, including that in the Zangelan district and the city of Goradiz and on Azerbaijan's southern frontier, and to assist refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in security and dignity;

8. Reiterates its request that the Secretary-General, the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE and the Chairman of the CSCE Minsk Conference continue to report to the Council on the progress of the Minsk process and on all aspects of the situation on the ground, in particular on the implementation of its relevant resolutions, and on present and future cooperation between the CSCE and the United Nations in this regard;

9. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Agenda item 54
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Letter dated 9 November 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a letter addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Osman Ertuğ, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex, which contains the text of a letter sent to you by His Excellency Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see appendix) could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 54, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Inal BATU
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

ANNEX

Letter dated 9 November 1993 from Mr. Osman Ertuğ
addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of a self-explanatory letter dated 5 November 1993 addressed to you by His Excellency Rauf R. Denktaş, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see appendix).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 54, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Osman ERTUĞ
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

APPENDIX

Letter dated 5 November 1993 from Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş addressed to the Secretary-General

I have read Mr. Glafcos Clerides' address at the plenary of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations with great care and attention in order to glean from its contents some hope for future intercommunal cooperation and accord, but I was greatly disappointed.

Despite the linkage between the success of the negotiating process conducted within the framework of your mission of good offices and the establishment of a positive political atmosphere between the two sides in Cyprus, Mr. Clerides persists in totally disregarding the rights and aspirations of the Turkish Cypriot people and making allegations concerning, inter alia, the "aggression" and "intransigence of Turkey" and the "flagrant violation of human rights" in Cyprus, thus creating artificial issues such as that of the so-called "settlers" and "refugees", and exploiting, for political purposes, the issue of missing persons.

Mr. Clerides overlooks the background to the events of 1974 by portraying the intercommunal question of Cyprus as a question of "invasion and occupation" by Turkey, having arisen in 1974 with the onset of the Turkish intervention. As you are well aware, given the 29-year presence of United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) on the island, the Cyprus question has not been brought about by Turkey's intervention in Cyprus, but in the words of Mr. Clerides himself it arose in 1963 as a result of "the Greek Cypriot preoccupation that Cyprus should be a Greek Cypriot State, with a protected Turkish Cypriot minority" (My Deposition, vol. III, p. 105).

The Cyprus problem arose in 1963 when the Greek Cypriot side tried through armed attack to convert a bicommunal partnership State into a Greek Cypriot republic. The notorious plan (the Akritas Plan) under which the Greek Cypriot side prepared the ground and executed its criminal activities has been before the Security Council as document S/12722, dated 30 May 1978. The Cyprus problem, therefore, is a problem of forced occupation of the seat of bicommunal government by one of the partners of the State.

Following the forceful destruction of the 1960 binational partnership State by the Greek Cypriots, the years between 1963 and 1974 witnessed unprecedented cruelty, violence and other violations of human rights perpetrated by the Greek Cypriots against the Turkish Cypriot people and stand as a shameful episode in the recent history of the island. During 1963-1974 hundreds of Turkish Cypriots were killed by armed Greek Cypriot paramilitaries and hundreds more were abducted or subjected to enforced disappearance, never to be seen again. The Turkish Cypriot populace were forced to live in enclaves under siege and subhuman conditions, denied the enjoyment of even their most basic human rights and freedoms, as the Greek Cypriot side has been relentless in its attempt to subjugate the Turkish Cypriots by force of arms and by means of systematic oppression and discrimination. There is, in fact, ample graphic evidence of a genocidal campaign of ethnic cleansing perpetrated by the Greek Cypriots during 1963-1974 (see, for example, the reports of the Secretary-General dated

10 September 1964 (S/5950 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2), paras. 103, 180, 190-192, 203, 205, 221 and 222, and Add.2, para. 4; 15 June 1964 (S/5764 and Corr.1), paras. 49, 50 and 93; 10 December 1965 (S/7001), para. 162; 10 June 1966 (S/7350), paras. 100 and 111; and 8 December 1967 (S/8286), para. 126).

Turkish Cypriots were relieved from this agony and were saved from total extermination only by the timely intervention of Turkey in 1974, after the Greeks had made a bloody attempt at the final takeover of Cyprus by Greece through a coup d'état organized by the Junta in Athens and its collaborators in Cyprus. Turkey's intervention was undertaken in accordance with her rights and obligations under the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 and was fully legal and legitimate, as confirmed even by courts in Athens. The 1974 intervention, therefore, is not the cause of the Cyprus question, as portrayed by Greek Cypriots, but the direct consequence of the Greek and Greek Cypriot conspiracy and overt acts during 1963-1974 aimed at converting a bicommunal State into a Greek Cypriot State prior to annexing the island to Greece.

It is clear from the foregoing that the Greek Cypriot side is in no position to lecture anybody on human rights issues, since it is the Greek Cypriot side that has violated all the basic rights and freedoms of the Turkish Cypriots during the 1963-1974 era and, to a great extent, continues to do so even today through the application of an all-embracing inhuman embargo against the Turkish Cypriots and a hostile campaign of defamation and propaganda, under the false title of the "Government of Cyprus", with a view to isolating the Turkish Cypriot co-founder partner of the Republic and thus forcing Turkish Cypriots to abandon their basic rights as a politically equal partner in the body politic of Cyprus.

When judged against this background of past and present violation of human rights by the Greek Cypriot administration, the unfounded allegations levelled by the Greek Cypriot side in international forums clearly appear as an attempt to gloss over their own criminal record in this respect.

As regards the question of displaced persons, it should be mentioned that nearly four fifths of the Turkish Cypriot population, some of them for the second and some for the third time since 1955, have been rendered refugees or became displaced persons, as a result of the Greek Cypriot side's armed attempts to annex Cyprus to Greece.

Mr. Clerides has apparently forgotten to mention that the question of displaced persons has been settled by agreement between the two sides at the third round of the intercommunal talks held at Vienna between 31 July and 2 August 1975, whereby the two sides agreed on a voluntary regrouping of populations in their own respective territory, the Turkish Cypriots in the North and the Greek Cypriots in the South, paving the way for a bizonal settlement of the Cyprus question, which became the basis for a settlement of the problem as from my agreement with Archbishop Makarios in 1977.

The demographic structure of Cyprus is another subject that the Greek Cypriot administration has been persistently exploiting, notwithstanding the fact that it is the Greek Cypriot side itself that, in collaboration with Greece, has long been trying to alter the demographic structure of the island in favour of the Greek side.

Following the Greek Cypriot onslaught on the Turkish Cypriot people in 1963, mainland Greek troops in their thousands were brought to the island clandestinely, as admitted by high Greek officials, in order to materialize the annexation of the island to Greece (ENOSIS). The reports of United Nations Secretaries-General to the Security Council (e.g. S/5950 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2 of 10 September 1964 and S/8286 of 8 December 1967) testify to the fact that these Greek mainland troops were granted "legal status" by the Greek Cypriot regime in order to resettle them in the island on a permanent basis.

While this was being done, as part and parcel of the Greek Cypriot policy of annihilating the Turkish Cypriot population through massacres, oppression, discrimination and violation of their human rights, there was a forced emigration of the Turkish Cypriot population from Cyprus, first during EOKA terrorism (1955-1958) and then during the 1963-1974 period of oppression and hardships imposed on the Turkish Cypriot side. After 1974, a significant number of the Turkish Cypriots who were forced to emigrate between 1963 and 1974 returned to the safety of their homes and took up their economic activities. The new economic activity in Northern Cyprus created opportunities and vacancies and hence a need for new and greater manpower. As a result, a number of workers came to work in the agricultural, tourism, construction and industrial sectors in Northern Cyprus. Akin to standard international practice and in accordance with the laws of the country, some of these people have been granted citizenship of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus after five years of residence.

Mr. Clerides' concern regarding the "fate of missing persons" is another example of the Greek Cypriot side's persistence to exploit humanitarian subjects for propaganda purposes at the expense of those on both sides who have lost their loved ones.

The Greek Cypriot side deliberately keeps this issue alive in order to exploit it for propaganda purposes, although it knows very well that those Greek Cypriots it claims to be "missing" were in fact killed by the Greeks themselves in the internecine war during the coup d'état of 15 July 1974, or killed during the events that the coup had triggered off.

Ample evidence testifying to this fact can also be found in the statements of prominent Greek Cypriot personalities ranging from Greek Orthodox priests to Members of Parliament. (The Greek newspaper Ta Nea published an interview on 28 February 1976 with Father Papatsestos, the Greek Orthodox priest in charge of the Nicosia cemetery. He recounted the events of 17 July 1974 when Greek officers required him to bury truckloads of Greek Cypriots in mass graves, together with one young Greek Cypriot whom they buried alive and 10 dead Turkish Cypriots. This one priest counted at least 127 bodies brought to him, and there must have been many similar incidents throughout the island.) The Greek Cypriot side's persistence in exploiting this issue, therefore, serves no other purpose than obstructing the work of the tripartite Committee on Missing Persons, which is charged with the task of resolving this humanitarian issue.

The allegations made by Mr. Clerides during the said plenary clearly do not square with the search for an agreed political settlement of the Cyprus question, which will reflect the political equality and co-founder sovereignty status of the two sides, for the path towards such a settlement based on political equality and partnership is not the path of such confrontation but

rather the path of friendship and clarity of position. Unfortunately even at this juncture, the Turkish Cypriot side does not know the true Greek Cypriot position on the Set of Ideas and the nature of amendments they wish to be made to it.

While it is clear that a political settlement must be mutually acceptable and arrived at through the free will of the two sides by way of direct negotiations conducted on an equal footing, on the evidence of recent Greek Cypriot press reports it is clear that the Greek Cypriots will persist in shunning direct talks and contact with the Turkish Cypriot side. Moreover, in line with its policy of internationally isolating the Turkish Cypriot side, the Greek Cypriot side is doing its utmost to prevent us from coming into contact with third parties and from being seen or heard by all concerned as justice would demand if justice is to be done. A case in point has been the uproar in Southern Cyprus over British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd's brief contact with me in Nicosia recently.

The remarks of Mr. Clerides at the said plenary and the confrontational attitude on the part of the Greek Cypriots at large begs the question as to how it will prove possible to work out an agreed political settlement with people who cannot even tolerate our contacts with third parties and refuse to acknowledge our vested rights as an equal partner in the Cyprus dispute.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 54, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Rauf R. DENKTAŞ
President

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NOTE VERBALE DATED 22 OCTOBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF BURKINA FASO TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT

The Permanent Mission of Burkina Faso to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretariat and, with reference to its note verbale dated 22 September 1993 concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 864 (1993), has the honour to state that the Government of Burkina Faso does not produce any of the prohibited goods mentioned in paragraph 19 of the aforementioned resolution.

Moreover, Burkina Faso does not have any trade relations with Angola.

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Letter dated 8 November 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In my capacity as representative of the country which currently holds the Presidency of the Council of the European Community, I am attaching herewith the list of measures adopted by the European Community in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 24 of resolution 864 (1993) in order to meet the obligations set forth in paragraph 19 of that resolution.

The Council of Ministers of the European Community will shortly be promulgating a regulation, directly applicable in the internal law of member States, with a view to implementing the sanctions imposed by the Security Council against União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA).

The regulation prohibits as of 25 September 1993 the sale or supply to UNITA of armaments and related matériel, including arms and munitions, military vehicles and equipment and the corresponding spare parts.

The regulation prohibits as of 25 September 1993 the sale or supply of petroleum and petroleum products, regardless of whether they originated in the Community, to the territory of Angola through points of entry other than those designated by the Government of Angola.

The regulation also prohibits any activity which has the intent or effect of promoting, directly or indirectly, the aforementioned operations.

(Signed) Paul NOTERDAEME
Permanent Representative

93-62553 (E) 121193 121193 141193

UNITED NATIONS **S**

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S/26723
11 November 1993
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LETTER DATED 8 NOVEMBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BELGIUM TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 24 of Security Council resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola, I have the honour to attach herewith a list of the measures adopted by Belgium to meet the obligations set forth in paragraph 19 of that resolution.

The Council of Ministers of the European Communities will shortly be promulgating a regulation, directly applicable in Belgian internal law, with a view to implementing the sanctions imposed by the Security Council against União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA).

The European regulation will prohibit as of 25 September 1993 the sale or supply to UNITA of armaments and related matériel, including arms and munitions, military vehicles and equipment and the corresponding spare parts. Belgian internal law provides that any export of armaments from Belgian territory must be subject to the issuance of a licence.

The European regulation prohibits as of 25 September 1993 the sale or supply of petroleum and petroleum products, irrespective of whether they originate in the community, to the territory of Angola through points of entry other than those designated by the Government of Angola. With regard to Belgium, a ministerial order giving the administrative body in charge of issuing export licences the necessary powers to apply the petroleum embargo will be published in the Moniteur belge shortly after the aforementioned regulations appear in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

The European regulation also prohibits any activity which has the intent or effect of promoting, directly or indirectly, the aforementioned operations.

(Signed) Paul NOTERDAEME
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

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S/26724
11 November 1993
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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE QUESTION OF HAITI

1. On 30 October 1993, the date on which the President of Haiti was to have returned to his country pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Governors Island Agreement (S/26063), the President of the Security Council made a statement (S/26668) on behalf of the members of the Council insisting on compliance with the Agreement, which remains in force as the only framework for the solution of the Haitian crisis. The Council supported the invitation by my Special Representative to the Haitian parties to meet on 5 November and requested that I report urgently to it. This report is submitted pursuant to that statement.

2. The Council will recall that in my report dated 13 October 1993 (S/26573) I had indicated that the incidents of 11 October, which had prevented the deployment of military personnel of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), had been the culmination of a situation characterized by the repeatedly observed refusal on the part of the Haitian authorities to facilitate the operation of UNMIH, follow the instructions of the constitutional Government and put an end to the violence perpetrated by armed civilians with the complicity of the police.

3. On the basis of the report, the Council decided, by its resolution 873 (1993) to reimpose the sanctions set out in resolution 841 (1993) as of 2359 hours on 18 October 1993 unless the parties honoured their commitments. On 15 October President Aristide addressed a letter to the Secretary-General (S/26587) drawing attention to the assassination on 14 October of the Minister of Justice, Maître François-Guy Malary, and calling for all necessary measures to strengthen the provisions of resolution 873 (1993). On 16 October, by its resolution 875 (1993), the Council called upon Member States to use such measures as might be necessary to ensure strict implementation of the sanctions and, in particular to halt inward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destination. Since the attitude of the Haitian military did not change, the embargo entered into force on the date planned, under the surveillance of United States vessels, which were soon joined by Canadian, French, United Kingdom, Netherlands and Argentine vessels. The Organization of American States (OAS) reimposed its own economic sanctions that same day.

4. Following the departure of the Harlan County, which was celebrated as a victory by forces hostile to the restoration of the democratic process, the other members of UNMIH, those of the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) and non-essential personnel of international agencies left Haiti.

Many foreign nationals acted likewise, while Haitians living in the capital attempted to flee to the countryside. The Special Representative remained at Port-au-Prince with a number of assistants.

5. On 23 October 1993, a "Crisis Committee" led by the President of the Chamber of Deputies and comprising parliamentarians opposed to President Aristide, proposed an eleven-point compromise calling, inter alia, for a simultaneous vote on the acts concerning the amnesty and the police, the expansion of the Government and the elaboration by the Government of a protocol governing the presence of international missions. On the same day, a meeting between the Prime Minister, Mr. Robert Malval, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian Armed Forces, General Raoul Cédras, failed to produce an agreement.

6. On 25 October, the President of the Security Council made a statement on behalf of the members of the Council by which the Council reaffirmed, inter alia, the necessity of strict compliance with the Governors Island Agreement, failing which additional sanctions would be considered (S/26633).

7. On 26 and 27 October, the Parliament was unable to consider the acts concerning the police and the amnesty owing to the lack of a quorum. On 26 October, the Front national chrétien-démocrate (FNCD) parliamentary bloc, which supports President Aristide, offered its own eight-point compromise to end the crisis in Haiti.

8. On 28 October President Aristide addressed the General Assembly. In his statement he called for the departure of the military leaders and indicated that he would convene the parliament to vote on the bills on the police and the amnesty as soon as General Cédras, the members of the High Command and the General Staff, and Colonel Michel François and his allies had quit their posts. He asked the Prime Minister and the members of the Government not to resign. Lastly, he called for a complete and total blockade of Haiti (A/48/PV.41).

9. In a statement made to the press on my behalf on 29 October, the Special Representative expressed my regret that the timetable provided for in the Governors Island Agreement had not been respected, announced that resort to article 149 of the Haitian Constitution would compel me to recommend to the Security Council the strengthening of sanctions, and proposed that a meeting be held to discuss the implementation of paragraphs 5 to 9 of the Governors Island Agreement.

10. On that same day the Special Representative addressed letters of invitation for the 3rd and 4th of November to President Aristide and his Government, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, the President of the Senate and the Commander-in-Chief of Haiti's Armed Forces.

11. President Aristide replied to the Special Representative on 31 October, indicating that he was prepared to participate in the proposed meeting if it would lead at once to the departure of the military leaders, thereby facilitating the implementation of the other provisions of the Agreement. In a reply dated 1 November, General Cédras, for his part suggested that the Special Representative take a position on President Aristide's address to the General Assembly, which, General Cédras contended, repudiated the Governors Island Agreement; in addition, he called for clarifications of my proposals. Since the

letters required additional clarifications, a further exchange of correspondence took place, in which my Special Representative explained that the Agreement remained valid and that the sequence of events envisaged in the Agreement could not be modified unilaterally. The meeting was postponed to 5 and 6 November.

12. Present at the meeting which took place on 5 November at Port-au-Prince were the entire Government, assisted by two of President Aristide's advisers; the President of the Senate, accompanied by two FNCD senators; the President of the Chamber of Deputies, who is a member of the opposition, accompanied by two FNCD deputies and an opposition deputy; and the international community, with representatives of the four "Friends of the Secretary-General" and the United Nations. The seats reserved for the army remained empty. Three quarters of an hour after the start of the meeting, the Special Representative received a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, dated the preceding day's date, in which the latter criticized the fact that the meeting had been decided on and planned without any participation by the signatories of the Governors Island Agreement and the fact that internal security was being provided by foreign civilians. With the agreement of the participants, the Special Representative decided to adjourn the meeting. In a statement to the press, the Special Representative described as regrettable the absence of Haiti's armed forces, which were responsible for prolonging the crisis in Haiti and for the reimposition of sanctions; he pointed out that the Governors Island Agreement remained the basis for any settlement of the Haitian crisis and reaffirmed the determination of the international community to persevere in seeking a negotiated settlement in the context of the Agreement.

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ORIGINAL: FRENCH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE QUESTION CONCERNING HAITI

1. On 30 October 1993, the date on which the President of Haiti was to have returned to his country pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Governors Island Agreement (S/26063), the President of the Security Council made a statement (S/26668) on behalf of the members of the Council insisting on compliance with the Agreement, which remains in force as the only framework for the solution of the Haitian crisis. The Council supported the invitation by my Special Representative to the Haitian parties to meet on 5 November and requested that I report urgently to it. This report is submitted pursuant to that statement.

2. The Council will recall that in my report dated 13 October 1993 (S/26573) I had indicated that the incidents of 11 October, which had prevented the deployment of military personnel of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), had been the culmination of a situation characterized by the repeatedly observed refusal on the part of the Haitian authorities to facilitate the operation of UNMIH, follow the instructions of the constitutional Government and put an end to the violence perpetrated by armed civilians with the complicity of the police.

3. On the basis of the report, the Council decided, by its resolution 873 (1993) to reimpose the sanctions set out in resolution 841 (1993) as of 2359 hours on 18 October 1993 unless the parties honoured their commitments. On 15 October President Aristide addressed a letter to the Secretary-General (S/26587) drawing attention to the assassination on 14 October of the Minister of Justice, Maître François-Guy Malary, and calling for all necessary measures to strengthen the provisions of resolution 873 (1993). On 16 October, by its resolution 875 (1993), the Council called upon Member States to use such measures as might be necessary to ensure strict implementation of the sanctions and, in particular to halt inward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destination. Since the attitude of the Haitian military did not change, the embargo entered into force on the date planned, under the surveillance of United States vessels, which were soon joined by Canadian, French, United Kingdom, Netherlands and Argentine vessels. The Organization of American States (OAS) reimposed its own economic sanctions that same day.

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* Reissued for technical reasons.

4. Following the departure of the Harlan County, which was celebrated as a victory by forces hostile to the restoration of the democratic process, the other members of UNMIH, those of the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) and non-essential personnel of international agencies left Haiti. Many foreign nationals acted likewise, while Haitians living in the capital attempted to flee to the countryside. The Special Representative remained at Port-au-Prince with a number of assistants.

5. On 23 October 1993, a "Crisis Committee" led by the President of the Chamber of Deputies and comprising parliamentarians opposed to President Aristide, proposed an eleven-point compromise calling, inter alia, for a simultaneous vote on the acts concerning the amnesty and the police, the expansion of the Government and the elaboration by the Government of a protocol governing the presence of international missions. On the same day, a meeting between the Prime Minister, Mr. Robert Malval, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian Armed Forces, General Raoul Cédras, failed to produce an agreement.

6. On 25 October, the President of the Security Council made a statement on behalf of the members of the Council by which the Council reaffirmed, inter alia, the necessity of strict compliance with the Governors Island Agreement, failing which additional sanctions would be considered (S/26633).

7. On 26 and 27 October, the Parliament was unable to consider the acts concerning the police and the amnesty owing to the lack of a quorum. On 26 October, the Front national chrétien-démocrate (FNCD) parliamentary bloc, which supports President Aristide, offered its own eight-point compromise to end the crisis in Haiti.

8. On 28 October President Aristide addressed the General Assembly. In his statement he called for the departure of the military leaders and indicated that he would convene the parliament to vote on the bills on the police and the amnesty as soon as General Cédras, the members of the High Command and the General Staff, and Colonel Michel François and his allies had quit their posts. He asked the Prime Minister and the members of the Government not to resign. Lastly, he called for a complete and total blockade of Haiti (A/48/PV.41).

9. In a statement made to the press on my behalf on 29 October, the Special Representative expressed my regret that the timetable provided for in the Governors Island Agreement had not been respected, announced that resort to article 149 of the Haitian Constitution would compel me to recommend to the Security Council the strengthening of sanctions, and proposed that a meeting be held to discuss the implementation of paragraphs 5 to 9 of the Governors Island Agreement.

10. On that same day the Special Representative addressed letters of invitation for the 3rd and 4th of November to President Aristide and his Government, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, the President of the Senate and the Commander-in-Chief of Haiti's Armed Forces.

11. President Aristide replied to the Special Representative on 31 October, indicating that he was prepared to participate in the proposed meeting if it would lead at once to the departure of the military leaders, thereby facilitating the implementation of the other provisions of the Agreement. In a

reply dated 1 November, General Cédras, for his part suggested that the Special Representative take a position on President Aristide's address to the General Assembly, which, General Cédras contended, repudiated the Governors Island Agreement; in addition, he called for clarifications of my proposals. Since the letters required additional clarifications, a further exchange of correspondence took place, in which my Special Representative explained that the Agreement remained valid and that the sequence of events envisaged in the Agreement could not be modified unilaterally. The meeting was postponed to 5 and 6 November.

12. Present at the meeting which took place on 5 November at Port-au-Prince were the entire Government, assisted by two of President Aristide's advisers; the President of the Senate, accompanied by two FNCD senators; the President of the Chamber of Deputies, who is a member of the opposition, accompanied by two FNCD deputies and an opposition deputy; and the international community, with representatives of the four "Friends of the Secretary-General" and the United Nations. The seats reserved for the army remained empty. Three quarters of an hour after the start of the meeting, the Special Representative received a letter from the Commander-in-Chief, dated the preceding day's date, in which the latter criticized the fact that the meeting had been decided on and planned without any participation by the signatories of the Governors Island Agreement and the fact that internal security was being provided by foreign civilians. With the agreement of the participants, the Special Representative decided to adjourn the meeting. In a statement to the press, the Special Representative described as regrettable the absence of Haiti's armed forces, which were responsible for prolonging the crisis in Haiti and for the reimposition of sanctions; he pointed out that the Governors Island Agreement remained the basis for any settlement of the Haitian crisis and reaffirmed the determination of the international community to persevere in seeking a negotiated settlement in the context of the Agreement.

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26724/Corr.1
22 November 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE QUESTION CONCERNING HAITI

Corrigendum

Page 2, paragraph 7, third line

The name of the parliamentary bloc should read as follows:

Front national pour le changement et la démocratie (FNCD)

93-65106 (E) 221193 221193 221193

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26725
12 November 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 12 NOVEMBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF HAITI TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you a report concerning the meeting held from 9 to 11 November 1993 between President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and a government delegation.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Fritz LONGCHAMP
Permanent Representative

Annex

Meeting between President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and a government delegation

On Tuesday, 9 November, Wednesday, 10 November and Thursday, 11 November 1993, a far-reaching and fruitful dialogue was held between the President of the Republic and a ministerial delegation comprising Mrs. Claudette Werleigh, Mr. Victor Benoît, Mr. Berthony Bery, Mr. Louis Déjoie II, Mr. Hervey Denis and Mr. Jean J. Molière.

The ministerial delegation reiterated the Government's commitment to continue to fulfil its constitutional responsibilities and work to bring about the return of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide as soon as possible.

The President of the Republic, for his part, renewed his absolute and complete confidence in Prime Minister Robert Malval and all the members of his cabinet of Ministers who were working in extremely difficult circumstances.

The President of the Republic took the occasion to convey his congratulations to the Haitian people who, despite their suffering, were continuing their heroic resistance.

The President of the Republic and the government delegation adopted the following resolutions:

1. The Government of Prime Minister Robert Malval remains in power with the absolute and complete confidence of the President of the Republic.

2. The mandate of the Prime Minister is consistent with:

- the Constitution,
- the achievements and aspirations of 16 December 1990,
- the Governors Island Agreement and
- his general policy statement.

3. The Governors Island Agreement remains the sole framework for the resolution of the current crisis. It must be implemented in its entirety.

4. The executive branch requests that the international community ensure the immediate return of the Organization of American States/United Nations Civilian Mission and the deployment without delay of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). It hereby pledges its full cooperation to that end.

5. The executive branch insists that the Haitian armed forces scrupulously honour their commitments undertaken within the framework of the Governors Island Agreement.

6. The President of the Republic, having already honoured his commitments, calls upon each Minister to develop a dialogue between the various sectors with which the Ministry in question is normally in contact, with a view to rallying

all democratic forces willing to strive for the implementation of the Governors Island Agreement and the establishment of the rule of law in Haiti.

7. The President of the Republic and the government delegation have decided to implement, through the Ministries concerned, an urgent economic and social programme to alleviate the suffering of the population and launch the highly labour-intensive activities envisaged in the Government's development plan.

Done at the Embassy of Haiti, Washington, D.C., on 11 November 1993, the 190th year of independence.

(Signed) Jean-Bertrand ARISTIDE
President of the Republic

(Signed) Claudette WERLEIGH
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship

(Signed) Victor BENOÎT
Minister of National Education, Youth and Sports

(Signed) Berthony BERY
Minister for Social Affairs

(Signed) Louis DÉJOIE II
Minister of Commerce and Industry

(Signed) Hervey DENIS
Minister of Information and Culture

(Signed) Jean J. MOLIÈRE
Minister of Public Health and Population

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26726
12 November 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 NOVEMBER 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I should like to refer to your statement of 9 November on behalf of the Security Council (S/26717). In that statement, the Security Council requests that a report be submitted without delay on the incident on 8 November 1993 involving the taking hostage by Bosnian Serb forces of two persons travelling in armoured vehicles of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

In response to the above request, please find attached an extensive report submitted to me by UNPROFOR.

I am pleased to inform you that, following intensive negotiations under the direct supervision of my Special Representative, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, the two persons concerned were released on 11 November 1993 at 1300 hours local time.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE

INCIDENT REPORT

Incident at Rajlovac, 8 November 1993

I. GENERAL

1. The incident in question occurred when Serbs stopped an UNPROFOR convoy escorting a party of Bosnian Croat VIPs to Vares at the request of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Government, resulting in two escorted persons being taken from the convoy.

2. A number of reports and summaries of this incident have been prepared and are attached to the present report (see appendices I-VIII). The purpose of the present report is to present a total picture of the event.

II. NARRATIVE

3. On 6 November 1993, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Government requested, by telephone, transportation and escort of a delegation of Catholic churchmen from Sarajevo to Vares. At 1514 hours on that same day, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a facsimile (see appendix I) specifying that the mission was confidence-building to try to restore peace in Vares and detailing the passenger list (all Croats) as follows:

(a) Monsignor Vinko Puljic (in later documents identified as Archbishop of Sarajevo);

(b) Fra Petar Andjelovic;

(c) Fra Ljubo Lucic;

(d) Ivo Tomasevic (in later documents identified as a clergyman with the same honorific (His Highness) as Puljic);

(e) Ferdo Dejanovic, Security;

(f) Jozo Andzic, Security.

4. Bosnia and Herzegovina Command then became involved in telephone conversations with the Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry and the Commander of the Bosnian Serb Army, General Mladic, to arrange the mission. While Mladic gave approval in principle, he wanted the names of the party before final approval. The Bosnia and Herzegovina Command provided the names through the Bosnian Serb Army Liaison Officer at Lukavica (Major Indic), and through the United Nations Military Observer Liaison Officer at Pale.

5. During this period of communication, at 1135 hours on 7 November, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Command sent a facsimile (see appendix II) to Sector Sarajevo, instructing them to conduct the mission on 8 November 1993. The facsimile specified that the escort would include two armoured personnel carriers (APCs), would take the Rajlovac-Ilijas-Breza-Vares route and would remain in Vares until the departure of the party.

6. After receipt of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Command facsimile, Sector Sarajevo sent a facsimile (see appendix III) at 1500 hours on 7 November tasking French Battalion 2 to conduct the VIP escort. The facsimile repeated the details given in the Bosnia and Herzegovina Command facsimile.

7. Bosnian Serb Army clearance for the mission (see appendix IV) was received by the United Nations Military Observer Liaison Officer at Pale at 2300 hours and by the Bosnia and Herzegovina Command at 2311 hours on 7 November. The clearance is noted in the United Nations Military Observer Capsat message as being from the Bosnian Serb Army Chief of Staff Brigadier General Manojlo Milovanovic and signed by Colonel Magazin. It further specified that a Bosnian Serb Army APC would accompany the convoy through Bosnian Serb Army territory and would require 150 litres of fuel, the delivery of which was to be arranged.

8. On receiving the Bosnian Serb Army clearance, Bosnia and Herzegovina Command sent the message at appendix V, which confirmed that the clearance had been received and confirmed the tasking. The message stated that the escort was to be done in accordance with normal standard operating procedures.

9. At 0800 hours on 8 November 1993, Lieutenant Bournel of French Battalion 2 left the Presidency with the passengers and an escort of two APCs (VAB, or armoured forward-area vehicle, type), each with six soldiers. Both "security" men were in the rear APC. A light armoured reconnaissance vehicle was the escort commander's vehicle.

10. The convoy passed a Bosnia and Herzegovina checkpoint at 0820 hours with some difficulty, which may have been due to an apparent ignorance of the clearance on the part of the local commander.

11. Arriving at the Serb checkpoint at Rajlovac at 0845 hours, the convoy stopped and presented identification cards via the windows of the vehicles. The Serbs at the checkpoint refused to permit the convoy to proceed, initially citing the request for APC fuel mentioned above. During this period another VAB arrived but stopped under cover short of the checkpoint.

12. After the convoy had been stopped for 20 minutes, the battalion commander ordered the convoy to return to the unit. At this point, a number of Serbs (some armed with anti-armour weapons) and vehicles moved into position, preventing the French vehicles from moving.

13. Within 10 minutes (by 0915 hours) discussions began which revealed that the Serbs believed two of the passengers (Dejanovic and Andzic) to be war criminals. The Serbs repeatedly demanded the surrender of these two individuals, threatening to destroy the APCs if denied. Between 0915 and 1200 hours, further reinforcements, including additional anti-armour weapons,

arrived. Negotiations were also taking place involving the troops on the ground as well as battalion and sector groups. This resulted in the removal of the anti-armour weapons.

14. From 1200 hours, tensions appeared to reduce further as a result of talks involving Bosnian Serb authorities in Pale and Bosnia and Herzegovina Command Headquarters.

15. The situation became tense again from around 1500 hours as the delay in solution continued and night approached. The Serbs demanded again that the persons be surrendered.

16. At about 1530 hours, the Serbs began to threaten the escort commander and other soldiers with pistols to support their demands. Also during this period, Bosnia and Herzegovina Command requested UNPROFOR assistance in negotiating the release of the convoy.

17. The escort commander, in a final communication with his battalion at 1545 hours, was told again not to open the doors but to continue talking.

18. Excitement at the checkpoint rose, demands were repeated, and Serb irregular reinforcements arrived. Between 1600 and 1620 hours, the Serbs forced their way with crowbars into the APC containing the two men they wanted and took them away in a car.

19. The convoy was then ordered to return to the unit and was permitted to do so.

20. Despite a statement to the contrary by President Milosovic at 1840 hours on 8 November 1993, both men continue to be held to this time.

21. It has recently been learned that the Serbs have offered to release both men to the custody of UNPROFOR providing that UNPROFOR holds them pending trial for war crimes. UNPROFOR intends to accept them and hand them over to the Bosnia and Herzegovina Government for trial.

Appendix I

Request for escort from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Sarajevo, 06 November 1995
No: 05-1927/95

UNPROFOR
BH Command
Sarajevo

att: General Francise Briquemont
Commander

VERY URGENT

Dear General,

We would like to inform you that the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has made a decision to send the Delegation to Vares in regard of returning the confidention among the citizens of Vares.
The following are the members of the Delegation:

1. Monsignor Vinko Puljic
2. Fra Petar Andjelovic
3. Fra Ljubo Lucic
4. Ivo Tomasevic
5. Ferdo Dejanovic - Security
6. Jozo Andzic - Security

We kindly request the transportation of the above mentioned delegation from Sarajevo to Vares - Kiseljak and back to Sarajevo, tomorrow, Sunday, 07 November 1995, starting at 08,00 o'clock a.m. from Sarajevo (Presidential building), in the mission of bringing back the peace in the city of Vares, after the latest events.

We kindly ask you to provide the safe transportation for this delegation on mentioned route, being aware of the importance of this mission.

Thank you for your kind cooperation.

Co: Mr. Victor Andreev
UNPROFOR Civil Affairs
BH Head of Office

/...

Appendix II

Initial Bosnia and Herzegovina Command instructions to Sector Sarajevo

Q BH COMMAND MAIN OFFICE OF COS

age 1 of 1

~~ROUTINE/PRIORITY~~ IMMEDIATE ~~MOST IMMEDIATE/~~
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ ON RESTRICTED ~~UN CONFIDENTIAL SECRET~~

OUTGOING FAX NO.	DATE: 071135A NOV 93
TO: SECTOR SARAJEVO	FROM: HQ BH COMMAND KISELJAK
ATTN: COS	FILE REF.NO. : CS/6019/93 DRAFTER : RAMSAY TITLE : COS RELEASING OFF. : RAMSAY SIGNATURE :
INFO : HQ BHC FWD SARAJEVO (AA/COMD)	
INTERNAL DIST: ACOS G3, G5, CAC	
SUBJECT: BIH VIP MOVEMENT SARAJEVO - VARES	

MESSAGE

1. The Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina wishes to send a delegation to Vares with the aim of building confidence among the citizens of Vares. The members of the delegation are as follows:

a. Monsignor VINKO PULJIC.-

b. Fra PETAR ANDJELOVIC.

c. Fra LJUBO LUCIC.

d. IVO TOMASEVIC.

e. FERDO DELIMOVIC.

f. JOZO ANDJIC.

2. Please arrange 2 x APC at 180800 Nov at the Presidential building to collect 6 persons for move to Vares and return. The move from Sarajevo will be via the RAJLOVAC - ILIDZA - BREZA - VARES route. APC's will remain with the delegation and return to Sarajevo by 181000hrs.

/...

Appendix III

Sector Sarajevo instructions to French Battalion 2

UNPROFOR

ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/MOST IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED/RESTRICTED/CONFIDENTIAL/CRYPTO/ONLY

OUTGOING FAX NO.:	DATE: 07 1500A NOV 93
TO: FREBAT2.	FROM: SHQ SARAJEVO
FAX NO.:	FAX :
ATTN: OPs OFFR.	DRAFTER : CAP ROUX TITLE : DSOO RELEASE OFFR: SOO LCL DUBOIS SIGNATURE :
INFO INTERNAL: SC. DSC. COS. SOO. BH CMD LO. CIVIL AFFAIRS.	
SUBJECT: VIP Transportation . BiH VIP MOVEMENT SARAJEVO VARES CLT 201.44	

MESSAGE

1. MISSION
SECTOR SARAJEVO HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO PROVIDE TRANSPORT OF AN OFFICIAL BiH DELEGATION.

2. EXECUTION:
21.TIMING:
211.DATE OF MISSION: 08th NOV 93.
a) TIME OF RENDEZ VOUS: 0800A
b) RENDEZ VOUS POINT: PRESIDENCY
c) TRANSPORT BETWEEN: PRESIDENCY - VARES and back.
d) ESTIMATED TIME OF END OF MISSION: 1900A
e) ROUTE: RAJLOVAC - ILIJAS - BREZA - VARES

22. FREBAT2 WILL PROVIDE ESCORT AND TRANSPORTATION MEANS FOR THIS MISSION. THE VOLUME OF ASSETS WILL BE COMMUNICATED TO THE HQ OPS ROOM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

23. THE MISSION COMMANDER WILL BE PROVIDED BY : FREBAT2

3. LIST OF DELEGATES:
SEE IN ADDED ANNEX.

/...

Appendix IV

Clearance from the Bosnian Serb Army

IN.218 Page 1 UTC Time: 93-11-07 23:32:03

KL DUMUM LEO 403197250-FOJA X 7-NOV-1993 22:21:58 230056

TO: UNMO SII HQ
FROM: UNMO LC-PALE

DTG 072311 A NOV 93

RECEIVED FOLLOWING LETTER FROM MILOVANOVIC AS AT 072300 A NOV 93

HEADQUARTERS OF THE
S.R. ARMY
No: 17/230-608
November 7, 1993

U R G E N T

TO: UNPROFOR COMMAND - KISELJAK

Reference your letter be informed that we have approved the following:

1. Movement of the convoy from Rajlovac to Sarajevo on November 8, 1993.

2. Transport of the delegation of the Catholic Church [illegible] by Vinko Puljic, from Sarajevo to Vares, to take place on November 8, 1993, by your vehicle.
Your vehicles will be escorted by an APC through the territory of the Republic of Srpska. It is necessary to provide 150 liters of fuel for that escorting vehicle.
The place of delivery of fuel you will discuss with the LO in the Lukavica barracks.

CHIEF OF STAFF
Brigadier General
Manojlo Milovanovic
SIGNED BY
Colonel Magazin

IN.218

/...

Appendix V

Bosnia and Herzegovina Command confirmation to Sector Sarajevo

HQ BH COMMAND (MAIN) KISELJAK

Page 1 of 1

MOST IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

OUTGOING FAX NO: 302.	DATE/TIME: 0° 1903A NOV 93
TO: SECTOR SARAJEVO	FROM: BH COMD MAIN KISELJAK MAJ CROSER DEPUTY CHIEF OPS SIGNATURE:
FAX NO	FAX NO 873130152301528(INMARSAT)
ATTN: SENIOR OPS OFFICER	FILE REF NO: DRAFTER MAJ CROSER
INFO: BH COMD FAX NO	
SUBJECT: MOVE OF BIH VIPs TO VARES FROM SARAJEVO	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: COS G3, G5 CAO, DEP CH OPS UNMOs	

MESSAGE

REF BH COMD MAIN (COS) FAX 0? 1135A NOV 93.

1. MISSION AT REFERENCE HAS RECEIVED CLEARANCE FROM THE BSA.

2. SECTOR SARAJEVO TASKED TO EXECUTE AS PER DETAILS AT REFERENCE ENSURING ESCORT DONE AS PER NORMAL SOPs

/...

Appendix VI

Report on the incident by French Battalion 2

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

UNPROFOR

SECTOR SARAJEVO

8 November 1993

MEMORANDUM

TO : Chief of Staff, Sector Sarajevo

FROM : Colonel de RICHOUFFTZ de MANIN
Commander, FREBAT-2

DATE : 8 November 1993

Subject: Ambush of an UNPROFOR escort at RAJLOVAC checkpoint (north SARAJEVO).

On 8 November 1993, the French Infantry Battalion 2 stationed at the Sarajevo airport received the mission of transporting the Archbishop of Sarajevo to Vares. The Archbishop was accompanied by three clergymen and two bodyguards.

The mission was ordered by the UNPROFOR CP of Kiseljak in the afternoon of 7 november 1993 (see attached document). The estimatd itinerary to be followed as indicated on the document is as follows:

- SARAJEVO-RAJLOVAC-BREZA-VARES

Chronological events:

0800 hours - Lieutenant BOURNEL, heading the detachment of two APCs armed with 12,7 took the following persons:

- VAB 1: - His Highness Puljic - Mr Andjelovic - Mr Lucic; and

- VAB 2: - His Highness Tomasevic - Mr Dejanovic - Mr Andzic.

Each VAB consisted of a driver, group leader and four soldiers with two commanding the rear exits.

/...

0820 hours - Heading out of Sarajevo, the Bosnian checkpoint was crossed, although with some difficulty, moreover it seemed that the Chief of the local post was ignorant of the "clearance".

0845 hours - arriving at the Serbian checkpoint of RAJLOVAC they were held by the militia. The inspection of the identity cards was carried out from the windows of the armoured APCs. At the request of the head militiaman, the two APCs were forced to pack at the other side of the checkpoint.

0900 hours - Moving with about 10 armed militiamen and threatening around the APC. The pretext of the menace and lateness seemed to be aimed at the request for gasoil before crossing. After verification it was realized that a VBL was stopped in addition to the two APCs. They blocked the doors of the second VAB. Another VAB (VAB 3) sensing danger, went under cover 70 metres from the spot.

0905 hours - The battalion commander ordered the escort team to make a U-turn and head back to Sarajevo. The Serbian forces (militia and police force) composed of groups took position around the escort party with anti-tank weapons and calibres. The anti-tank weapons (missiles and rockets) were aimed at the armed UNPROFOR French vehicles present. About 10 Serbes on the causeway, encircled the three leading vehicles, with other serbian vehicles blocking the passage.

0915 hours - With the beginning of discussions in danger, the serbian militiamen denounced the presence of two criminals belonging to special Croat forces in the ambushed delegation. All talks, under the threat of fire being opened, continued till 1100 hours. The Serbs gave a warning thrice for the handing over of the two persons (Mrsers Andzic and Dejarovic) in two minutes or else face fire being opened on and destroying altogether the APCs and the personnel in the VAB.

/...

1030 hours - The ground was yet reinforced with four additioncl anti-tanks (two belonging to the forces of the Serbian army).

1200 hours - With combined action of COMSECTOR, the battalion and the elements on the spot, the anti-tanks were withdrawn. After talks between PALE and Kiseljak, tension reduced with assurances of a favourable outcomc.

1500 hours - A more hardening situation ensued as a result of delay in talks and a refusal by the UNPROFOR escort party to release the two persons to the Serbs. Hence, a new ultimatum was again addressed to the French for a favourable outcome before the night.

1530 hours - Lieutenant BOURNEL, head of the escort group, who was involved in talks with the militia was suppressed and threatened with several weapons, with a pistol aimed at his stomach. At this point, Staff Seageant TAINO, assistant junior officer, who wanted to interrupt was equally suppressed and threatened. Seageant DOBSA, junior officer and interpreter (serbo-croate) was also suppressed. An order was then given to Lieutenant BOURNEL to make open the rear doors of the APCs and to handover the two persons. Lieutenant BOURNEL opposes to the detriment of his life.

1545 hours - Lieutenant BOURNEL then informed the battalion for the last time. The Battalion Commander ordered him not to open the doors, but to continue talks no matter the outcome.

1600 hours - The militia excited at this time, reinforced and encouraged by other elements (CHETNIKS) arriving from RAJLOVAC raised the second VAB and with the help of iron bars broke the two outer openings, after efforts to open the main doors proved futile. They then forced out the two persons and whisked them away in a car. The entire Serbian defence system was high in a matter of minutes.

/...

1630 hours - By order, the entire detachment made a U-turn and returned back to the airport without hesitation.

REMARKS:

1. It is without doubt that the UNPROFOR detachment entrusted with the escort of the persons was ambushed:

- The Serbian checkpoint was informed well in advance before the vehicles approached it;

- Taking into account the military defence system on the ground, the number and variety of armour observed and the short intervals with which they reacted, it is confirmed that the ambush was premeditated;

- The link between the capturing serbian parties: militia, police and army was observed the whole day long.

2. The Chief of Section and of the escort detachment team executed orders given to them and did not at any given moment give in to oppression thereby putting in danger the persons under their responsibility.

3. The proximity and threat of open of fire in all the above circumstances, the unfavorable use of force on a difficult ground not permitting manocuvreing would have been mistaken for a useless massacre.

Appendix VII

Report on the incident by Bosnia and Herzegovina Command

HQ BH COMMAND MAIN OFFICE OF CON

Page 1 of 5

~~[illegible]~~ FLASH
~~[illegible]~~/UN RESTRICTED/~~[illegible]~~

OUTGOING FAX NO.	DATE: 061023A NOV 93
TO: HQ UNPROFOR ZAGREB HQ BHC FWD SARAJEVO SECTOR SARAJEVO	FROM: HQ BH COMMAND KISELJAK
ATTN: MR. STOLTENBERG -SRSG COS COMD	FILE REF.NO. : CO/0029/93 DRAFTER : RAMSAY TITLE : COS RELEASING OFF.: RAMSAY SIGNATURE : Ian Ramsay
INFO : FREBAT 2	
INTERNAL DIST: DCOS, ACOS G2, ACOS G3, CAC, UNMO, ECMM	
SUBJECT: INITIAL REPORT ON [illegible] SEIZURE - BOSNIAN DELEGATES	

MESSAGE

BACKGROUND

1. Attached is a copy of a fax from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia - Herzegovina sent at 1514 hrs on Saturday 06 Nov. An earlier request had been made by telephone.

2. Lengthy telephone discussions between the Ministry, BH Command, and BSA Commander General Mladic ensued. General Mladic gave approval in principle but wished to know details of whom the delegation consisted of. They were as follows:

a. Monsignor VINKO PUTJIC.

b. Fra PETAR ANDJELOVIC.

c. Fra LJUBO LUCIC.

d. IVO TOMASEVIC.

e. PERUO DEJANOVIC - security.

f. JOZO ANDZIC - security.

/...

These details were given to BSA Major Indic at Lukavica, and confirmed through the UNMO link at Pale. A copy of the confirmation is attached. There was insufficient time to send the delegation on the date required, so all timings were deferred 24 hrs.

3. At 0800 hrs Monday 00 Nov, the delegation was collected from the Presidency by a FREBAT 2 convoy of 1 VBL and 2 VAB armoured personnel carriers, which move through the Moslem check points at RAJLOVAC at about 0830 hrs.

THE INCIDENT

4. As soon as the convoy arrived at the Serb check point at RAJLOVAC, it was blocked front and rear by Serb tanks. The Serb police at the check point insisted on arresting JOZO ANDZIC whom they accused of war crimes. The FREBAT 2 escort refused to let the Serbs into the vehicles and a lengthy stand-off began while negotiations were carried out at escalating levels by Comd Sector Sarajevo, COS BH Command, CAO (Mr Andreev) and HQ UNPROFOR. Mr Andreev moved first to LUKOVICA and then to the PTT building in Sarajevo to continue negotiations at close hand, but senior Serb military personnel and politicians were not available. The Serb interlocutor Ministry of Foreign Affairs official RAKOVIC insisted that the Serbs must arrest ANDZIC.

5. Further investigations with Mr MALIK SKALJIC, advisor to the President of the Republic of Bosnia - Herzegovina revealed that ANDZIC is the head of a Special Bosnian Police unit called "LASTA" which has responsibilities for internal security under the command of the Ministry of the Interior. The task of this unit is apparently the maintenance of internal security within Sarajevo. This information was not told to UNPROFOR at the time of the initial request for the movement of the delegation. The Serbs have indicated that ANDZIC was trying to escape Sarajevo in an UNPROFOR APC.

6. Meanwhile on the ground the situation remained tense but at a stalemate throughout the day. At various times the APC's were threatened by Serb personnel and UNPROFOR armoured cars were placed in a readiness position at a discreet distance from the check point.

7. At 1630 hrs, the Serbs at the check point issued an ultimatum that ANDZIC be handed over or they would open fire on the detained UNPROFOR vehicles. This was refused and COS DHC ordered the reaction force to move up to the check point.

8. At about 1640 hrs a group of Serbs believed to be from the Ministry of the Interior, armed with crowbars, broke open the doors of the APC and dragged out two men (FERDO DZIANOVIC and JOZO ANDZIC) who were taken away, possibly to the barracks at ILIDZA.

9. All three APC's were released with the remainder of the four

/...

delegates. All returned to Sarajevo.

19. CCS BHC reported the situation to Vice President Dr. Ejub GANIC, who replied in well spoken english "You are responsible for what might happen to these people. You had enough time, you have aircraft. It is the full responsibility of your people to protect them". Later on BH Prime Minister Mr. SIJLADZIC called CAC Andreev and requested him to deal with this situation urgently.

COMMENT

10. The circumstances of this ambush are still not clear. In particular, it is not known who gave the orders for this kidnapping, nor to what degree the Serb army was involved.

/...

Attachment I



/...

Attachment II

Sector Sarajevo report on the incident

SECTEUR SARAJEVO
H.Q

SARAJEVO
LE 08 NOVEMBRE 1993

LCL FEUTREN YVES
SMIO

FICHE

Les deux "agents de sécurité" arrêtés par les serbes cet après-midi ne sont pas des policiers de petit calibre :

JOZO ANDZIC le chef de la force LASTVA et
FERDO DEJANOVIC le chef d'état-major du MUP.

- La force LASTVA "HIRONDELLE" est une unité autonome spéciale, d'environ 400 personnes, chargée de missions comme le nettoyage des 9 et 10ème brigades il y a quinze jours.
Elle travaille par commandos de 6 à 10 personnels, habillés de tenues sombres et cagoulés. La force disposerait d'un véhicule blindé style police armé de 12,7mm.
- La MUP constitue la police politique du régime, au nombre d'environ 300 personnels (anciens policiers et athlètes).

On peut se demander ce que faisaient ces deux personnages de haut rang dans la suite de l'archevêque : 3 hypothèses :

H1 - L'archevêque a été victime d'un chantage : voyage à VARES contre exfiltration des deux chefs.

H2 - Embuscade contre ces deux chefs d'origine croate de la part des bosniaques : en effet leurs noms figuraient sur la "clearance" demandée aux serbes.

H3 - Mission spéciale de ces deux chefs à VARES (ANDZIC est originaire de cette ville ou y aurait de la famille).

Si H2 s'avérait vrai, ce serait tout bénéfice pour les bosniaques, débarrassés de chefs croates encombrants, discréditant archevêque et UNPROFOR, tout cela sur le compte des serbes.

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Appendix VIII

UNPROFOR headquarters report on the incident

UNPROFOR

ROUTINE PRIORITY IMMEDIATE MOST IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED UN RESTRICTED UN CONFIDENTIAL UN SECRET ONLY

OUTGOING FAX NO.: C752	DATE: 08/11/93
TO: BOUTROS-GHALI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK	FROM: STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB
FAX NO.:	FAX NO.:
ATTN: BOUTROS-GHALI ANNAN GOULDING COT	FILE REF. NO.: DRAFTER: BRIG RITCHIE COS
INFO: FAX NO:	
SUBJECT: FORCIBLE REMOVAL BY BOSNIAN SERB FORCES OF TWO MUSLIMS FROM AN UNPROFOR VEHICLE	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SRSG, FC, HCA, DPC, COS, ACOS (G&I), PIO	

MESSAGE

A serious incident has taken place at a Bosnian Serb checkpoint at RAILOVAC North West of SARAJEVO when a delegation from SARAJEVO en route to VARES travelling in three FREBAT 2 armoured vehicles were blocked at 0830 hours 8 Nov by two Serbian tanks, one placed at either end of the convoy. After all day negotiations to release the convoy an ultimatum was given to hand over a member of the delegation, a Mr JOZO ANDZIC, or the Serbians would open fire.

Before the ultimatum expired, the Serbians forced open the rear door of one of the VABs, aimed their rifles at the French soldiers and dragged out Mr JOZO ANDZIC and Mr FERDO DEJJANOVIC. They are believed to have been taken to the nearby Serbian Barracks at RAILOVAC. All Serb forces have now withdrawn and the convoy has returned to Sarajevo.

/...

I was first made aware of this incident by Brigadier Ritchie who is Acting Force Commander at 1540 hours. This was within 5 minutes of his first learning of this incident from BH Command. I immediately telephoned President Milosovic to seek his good offices to release the convoy.

I was kept abreast of developments and at 1620 hours was told that the Serbs had forced entry into one of the VABs and removed the two men at gun point. Milosovic agreed to seek their early release.

At 1840 hours President Milosovic called back and informed me that one man had been released, that only one man was now kept under arrest, and that this man was a notorious war criminal who had travelled under false name.

What is quite clear is that this was a deliberate ambush on the UNPROFOR party as General Mladic had personally cleared the convoy on 7 November and knew precisely who was on board. The person they were after was Mr JOZO ANDZIC who is the head of a Special Police Unit of the BH Ministry of the Interior believed to be called LASTA.

The other members of the delegation were

Monsignor	MIKO	PULJIC
Father	PETAR	ANDJELOVIC
Father	LJUBO	LUCIC
Mr	IVO	TOMASEVIC

A full report will follow once all details have been clearly established.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26726*
12 November 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 NOVEMBER 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I should like to refer to your statement of 9 November on behalf of the Security Council (S/26717). In that statement, the Security Council requests that a report be submitted without delay on the incident on 8 November 1993 involving the taking hostage by Bosnian Serb forces of two persons travelling in armoured vehicles of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

In response to the above request, please find attached an extensive report submitted to me by UNPROFOR.

I am pleased to inform you that, following intensive negotiations under the direct supervision of my Special Representative, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, the two persons concerned were released on 11 November 1993 at 1300 hours local time.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

* Reissued for technical reasons.

Annex

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE

INCIDENT REPORT

Incident at Rajlovac, 8 November 1993

I. GENERAL

1. The incident in question occurred when Serbs stopped an UNPROFOR convoy escorting a party of Bosnian Croat VIPs to Vares at the request of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Government, resulting in two escorted persons being taken from the convoy.

2. A number of reports and summaries of this incident have been prepared and are attached to the present report (see appendices I-VIII). The purpose of the present report is to present a total picture of the event.

II. NARRATIVE

3. On 6 November 1993, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Government requested, by telephone, transportation and escort of a delegation of Catholic churchmen from Sarajevo to Vares. At 1514 hours on that same day, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a facsimile (see appendix I) specifying that the mission was confidence-building to try to restore peace in Vares and detailing the passenger list (all Croats) as follows:

(a) Monsignor Vinko Puljic (in later documents identified as Archbishop of Sarajevo);

(b) Fra Petar Andjelovic;

(c) Fra Ljubo Lucic;

(d) Ivo Tomasevic (in later documents identified as a clergyman with the same honorific (His Highness) as Puljic);

(e) Ferdo Dejanovic, Security;

(f) Jozo Andzic, Security.

4. Bosnia and Herzegovina Command then became involved in telephone conversations with the Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry and the Commander of the Bosnian Serb Army, General Mladic, to arrange the mission. While Mladic gave approval in principle, he wanted the names of the party before final approval. The Bosnia and Herzegovina Command provided the names through the Bosnian Serb Army Liaison Officer at Lukavica (Major Indic), and through the United Nations Military Observer Liaison Officer at Pale.

5. During this period of communication, at 1135 hours on 7 November, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Command sent a facsimile (see appendix II) to Sector Sarajevo, instructing them to conduct the mission on 8 November 1993. The facsimile specified that the escort would include two armoured personnel carriers (APCs), would take the Rajlovac-Ilijas-Breza-Vares route and would remain in Vares until the departure of the party.

6. After receipt of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Command facsimile, Sector Sarajevo sent a facsimile (see appendix III) at 1500 hours on 7 November tasking French Battalion 2 to conduct the VIP escort. The facsimile repeated the details given in the Bosnia and Herzegovina Command facsimile.

7. Bosnian Serb Army clearance for the mission (see appendix IV) was received by the United Nations Military Observer Liaison Officer at Pale at 2300 hours and by the Bosnia and Herzegovina Command at 2311 hours on 7 November. The clearance is noted in the United Nations Military Observer Capsat message as being from the Bosnian Serb Army Chief of Staff
Brigadier General Manojlo Milovanovic and signed by Colonel Magazin. It further specified that a Bosnian Serb Army APC would accompany the convoy through Bosnian Serb Army territory and would require 150 litres of fuel, the delivery of which was to be arranged.

8. On receiving the Bosnian Serb Army clearance, Bosnia and Herzegovina Command sent the message at appendix V, which confirmed that the clearance had been received and confirmed the tasking. The message stated that the escort was to be done in accordance with normal standard operating procedures.

9. At 0800 hours on 8 November 1993, Lieutenant Bournel of French Battalion 2 left the Presidency with the passengers and an escort of two APCs (VAB, or armoured forward-area vehicle, type), each with six soldiers. Both "security" men were in the rear APC. A light armoured reconnaissance vehicle was the escort commander's vehicle.

10. The convoy passed a Bosnia and Herzegovina checkpoint at 0820 hours with some difficulty, which may have been due to an apparent ignorance of the clearance on the part of the local commander.

11. Arriving at the Serb checkpoint at Rajlovac at 0845 hours, the convoy stopped and presented identification cards via the windows of the vehicles. The Serbs at the checkpoint refused to permit the convoy to proceed, initially citing the request for APC fuel mentioned above. During this period another VAB arrived but stopped under cover short of the checkpoint.

12. After the convoy had been stopped for 20 minutes, the battalion commander ordered the convoy to return to the unit. At this point, a number of Serbs (some armed with anti-armour weapons) and vehicles moved into position, preventing the French vehicles from moving.

13. Within 10 minutes (by 0915 hours), discussions began which revealed that the Serbs believed two of the passengers (Dejanovic and Andzic) to be war criminals. The Serbs repeatedly demanded the surrender of these two individuals, threatening to destroy the APCs if denied. Between 0915 and 1200 hours, further reinforcements, including additional anti-armour weapons,

arrived. Negotiations were also taking place involving the troops on the ground as well as battalion and sector groups. This resulted in the removal of the anti-armour weapons.

14. From 1200 hours, tensions appeared to reduce further as a result of talks involving Bosnian Serb authorities in Pale and Bosnia and Herzegovina Command Headquarters.

15. The situation became tense again from around 1500 hours as the delay in solution continued and night approached. The Serbs demanded again that the persons be surrendered.

16. At about 1530 hours, the Serbs began to threaten the escort commander and other soldiers with pistols to support their demands. Also during this period, Bosnia and Herzegovina Command requested UNPROFOR assistance in negotiating the release of the convoy.

17. The escort commander, in a final communication with his battalion at 1545 hours, was told again not to open the doors but to continue talking.

18. Excitement at the checkpoint rose, demands were repeated, and Serb irregular reinforcements arrived. Between 1600 and 1620 hours, the Serbs forced their way with crowbars into the APC containing the two men they wanted and took them away in a car.

19. The convoy was then ordered to return to the unit and was permitted to do so.

20. Despite a statement to the contrary by President Milosovic at 1840 hours on 8 November 1993, both men continue to be held to this time.

21. It has recently been learned that the Serbs have offered to release both men to the custody of UNPROFOR providing that UNPROFOR holds them pending trial for war crimes. UNPROFOR intends to accept them and hand them over to the Bosnia and Herzegovina Government for trial.

Appendix I

Request for escort from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Sarajevo, 06 November 1995
No: 05-1927/95

UNPROFOR
BH Command
Sarajevo

att: General Francise Briquemont
Commander

VERY URGENT

Dear General,

We would like to inform you that the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has made a decision to send the Delegation to Vares in regard of returning the confidention among the citizens of Vares.
The following are the members of the Delegation:

1. Monsignor Vinko Puljic
2. Fra Petar Andjelovic
3. Fra Ljubo Lucic
4. Ivo Tomasevic
5. Ferdo Delanovic - Security
6. Jozo Andzic - Security

We kindly request the transportation of the above mentioned delegation from Sarajevo to Vares - Kiseljak and back to Sarajevo, tomorrow, Sunday, 07 November 1995, starting at 08,00 o'clock a.m. from Sarajevo (Presidential building), in the mission of bringing back the peace in the city of Vares, after the latest events.

We kindly ask you to provide the safe transportation for this delegation on mentioned route, being aware of the importance of this mission.

Thank you for your kind cooperation.

Co: Mr. Victor Andreev
UNPROFOR Civil Affairs
BH Head of Office

/...

Appendix II

Initial Bosnia and Herzegovina Command instructions to Sector Sarajevo

Q BH COMMAND MAIN OFFICE OF COS

age 1 of 1

~~ROUTINE/PRIORITY~~ (IMMEDIATE) ~~MOST IMMEDIATE~~/
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ (UN RESTRICTED) ~~UN CONFIDENTIAL SECRET~~

OUTGOING FAX NO.	DATE: 071135A NOV 93
TO: SECTOR SARAJEVO	FROM: HQ BH COMMAND KISELJAK
ATTN: COS	FILE REF.NO. : CG/(0:9/93) DRAFTER : RAMSAY TITLE : COS RELEASING OFF. : RAMSAY SIGNATURE :
INFO : HQ BHC FWD SARAJEVO (AA/COMD)	
INTERNAL DIST: ACOS G3, G5, CAC	
SUBJECT: BIH VIP MOVEMENT SARAJEVO - VARES	

MESSAGE

1. The Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina wishes to send a delegation to Vares with the aim of building confidence among the citizens of Vares. The members of the delegation are as follows:

a. Monsignor VINKO PULJIC.-

b. Fra PETAR ANDJELOVIC.

c. Fra LJUBO LUCIC.

d. IVO TOMASEVIC.

e. FERDO DELALOVIC.

f. JOZO ANDJIC.

2. Please arrange 2 x APC at 180800 Nov at the Presidential building to collect 6 persons for move to Vares and return. The move from Sarajevo will be via the RAJLOVAC - ILIJAS - BRDA - VARES route. APC's will remain with the delegation and return to Sarajevo by 190Chrs.

/...

Appendix III

Sector Sarajevo instructions to French Battalion 2

UNPROFOR

ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/MOST IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED/RESTRICTED/CONFIDENTIAL/CRYPTO/CNLY

OUTGOING FAX NO.:	DATE: 07 1500A NOV 93
TO: FREBAT2.	FROM: SHQ SARAJEVO
FAX NO.:	FAX :
ATTN: CPs OFFR.	DRAFTER : CAP ROUX TITLE : DSOO RELEASE OFFR: SOO LCL DUBOIS SIGNATURE :
INFO INTERNAL: SC. DSC. COS. SOO. BH CMD LO. CIVIL AFFAIRS.	
SUBJECT: VIP Transportation . BiH VIP MOVEMENT SARAJEVO VARES CLT 201.44	

MESSAGE

1. MISSION
SECTOR SARAJEVO HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO PROVIDE TRANSPORT OF AN OFFICIAL BiH DELEGATION.

2. EXECUTION:
21. TIMING:
211. DATE OF MISSION: 08th NOV 93.
a) TIME OF RENDEZ VOUS: 0800A
b) RENDEZ VOUS POINT: PRESIDENCY
c) TRANSPORT BETWEEN: PRESIDENCY - VARES and back.
d) ESTIMATED TIME OF END OF MISSION: 1900A
e) ROUTE: RAJLOVAC - ILIJAS - BREZA - VARES

22. FREBAT2 WILL PROVIDE ESCORT AND TRANSPORTATION MEANS FOR THIS MISSION. THE VOLUME OF ASSETS WILL BE COMMUNICATED TO THE HQ OPS ROOM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

23. THE MISSION COMMANDER WILL BE PROVIDED BY : FREBAT2

3. LIST OF DELEGATES:
SEE IN ADDED ANNEX.

/...

Appendix IV

Clearance from the Bosnian Serb Army

IN.218 Page 1 UTC Time: 93-11-07 22:32:13

MC DUMUM LCO 4931972F6-FOJA X 7-NOV-1993 22:21:58 220056

TO: UNMO SECTOR HQ
FROM: UNMO LO-PALE

DTG 072311 A NOV 93

RECEIVED FOLLOWING LETTER FROM MILOVANOVIC AT 072300 A NOV 93

HEADQUARTERS OF THE
S.R. ARMY
No: 17/230-608
November 7, 1993

U R G E N T

TO: UNPROFOR COMMAND - KISELJAK

Reference your letter be informed that we have approved the following:

1. Movement of the convoy from Bijeljina to Sarajevo on November 8, 1993.

2. Transport of the delegation of the Catholic Church led by Vinko Puljic, from Sarajevo to Vareš, to take place on November 8, 1993, by your vehicle.
Your vehicles will be escorted by an APC through the territory of the Republic of Srpska. It is necessary to provide 150 liters of fuel for that escorting vehicle.
The place of delivery of fuel you will discuss with the LO in the Kiseljak barracks.

CHIEF OF STAFF
Brigadier General
Manojlo Milovanovic
SIGNED BY
Colonel Mogatin

IN.218

/...

Appendix V

Bosnia and Herzegovina Command confirmation to Sector Sarajevo

HQ BiH COMMAND (MAIN) KISELJAK

Page 1 of 1

MOST IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

OUTGOING FAX NO. 302.	DATE TIME: 0° 1903A NOV 93
TO. SECTOR SARAJEVO	FROM: BH COMD MAIN KISELJAK MAJ CROSER DEPUTY CHIEF OPS SIGNATURE:
FAX NO	FAX NO 873*30*522/1522(INMARSAT)
ATTN. SENIOR OPS OFFICER	FILE REF NO: DRAFTER MAJ CROSER
INFO BH: HQ FAX NO	
SUBJECT. MOVE OF BIH VIPs TO VARES FROM SARAJEVO	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: COS G3, G5 CAO, DEP CH OPS UNMOs	

MESSAGE

REF BH HQ MAIN (COS) FAX 0° 1135A NOV 93.

1. MISSION AT REFERENCE HAS RECEIVED CLEARANCE FROM THE BSA.

2. SECTOR SARAJEVO TASKED TO EXECUTE AS PER DETAILS AT REFERENCE ENSURING ESCORT DONE AS PER NORMAL SOPs

/...

Appendix VI

Report on the incident by French Battalion 2

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

UNPROFOR

SECTOR SARAJEVO

8 November 1993

MEMORANDUM

TO : Chief of Staff, Sector Sarajevo

FROM : Colonel de RICHOUFFTZ de MANIN
Commander, FREBAT-2

DATE : 8 November 1993

Subject: Ambush of an UNPROFOR escort at RAJLOVAC checkpoint (north SARAJEVO).

On 8 November 1993, the French Infantry Battalion 2 stationed at the Sarajevo airport received the mission of transporting the Archbishop of Sarajevo to Vares. The Archbishop was accompanied by three clergymen and two bodyguards.

The mission was ordered by the UNPROFOR CP of Kiseljak in the afternoon of 7 november 1993 (see attached document). The estimatd itinerary to be followed as indicated on the document is as follows:

- SARAJEVO-RAJLOVAC-BREZA-VARES

Chronological events:

0800 hours - Lieutenant BOURNEL, heading the detachment of two APCs armed with 12,7 took the following persons:

- VAB 1: - His Highness Puljic - Mr Andjelovic - Mr Lucic; and

- VAB 2: - His Highness Tomasevic - Mr Dejanovic - Mr Andzic.

Each VAB consisted of a driver, group leader and four soldiers with two commanding the rear exits.

/...

0820 hours - Heading out of Sarajevo, the Bosnian checkpoint was crossed, although with some difficulty, moreover it seemed that the Chief of the local post was ignorant of the "clearance".

0845 hours - arriving at the Serbian checkpoint of RAJLOVAC they were held by the militia. The inspection of the identity cards was carried out from the windows of the armoured APCs. At the request of the head militiaman, the two APCs were forced to pack at the other side of the checkpoint.

0900 hours - Moving with about 10 armed militiamen and threatening around the APC. The pretext of the menace and lateness seemed to be aimed at the request for gasoil before crossing. After verification it was realized that a VBL was stopped in addition to the two APCs. They blocked the doors of the second VAB. Another VAB (VAB 3) sensing danger, went under cover 70 metres from the spot.

0905 hours - The battalion commander ordered the escort team to make a U-turn and head back to Sarajevo. The Serbian forces (militia and police force) composed of groups took position around the escort party with anti-tank weapons and calibres. The anti-tank weapons (missiles and rockets) were aimed at the armed UNPROFOR French vehicles present. About 10 Serbes on the causeway, encircled the three leading vehicles, with other serbian vehicles blocking the passage.

0915 hours - With the beginning of discussions in danger, the serbian militiamen denounced the presence of two criminals belonging to special Croat forces in the ambushed delegation. All talks, under the threat of fire being opened, continued till 1100 hours. The Serbs gave a warning thrice for the handing over of the two persons (Mrssrs Andzic and Dejarovic) in two minutes or else face fire being opened on and destroying altogether the APCs and the personnel in the VAB.

1030 hours - The ground was yet reinforced with four additional anti-tanks (two belonging to the forces of the Serbian army).

1200 hours - With combined action of COMSECTOR, the battalion and the elements on the spot, the anti-tanks were withdrawn. After talks between PALE and Kiseljak, tension reduced with assurances of a favourable outcome.

1500 hours - A more hardening situation ensued as a result of delay in talks and a refusal by the UNPROFOR escort party to release the two persons to the Serbs. Hence, a new ultimatum was again addressed to the French for a favourable outcome before the night.

1530 hours - Lieutenant BOURNEL, head of the escort group, who was involved in talks with the militia was suppressed and threatened with several weapons, with a pistol aimed at his stomach. At this point, Staff Seageant TAINO, assistant junior officer, who wanted to interrupt was equally suppressed and threatened. Seageant DOBSA, junior officer and interpreter (serbo-croate) was also suppressed. An order was then given to Lieutenant BOURNEL to make open the rear doors of the APCs and to handover the two persons. Lieutenant BOURNEL opposes to the detriment of his life.

1545 hours - Lieutenant BOURNEL then informed the battalion for the last time. The Battalion Commander ordered him not to open the doors, but to continue talks no matter the outcome.

1600 hours - The militia excited at this time, reinforced and encouraged by other elements (CHETNIKS) arriving from RAJLOVAC raised the second VAB and with the help of iron bars broke the two outer openings, after efforts to open the main doors proved futile. They then forced out the two persons and whisked them away in a car. The entire Serbian defence system was high in a matter of minutes.

/...

1630 hours - By order, the entire detachment made a U-turn and returned back to the airport without hesitation.

REMARKS:

1. It is without doubt that the UNPROFOR detachment entrusted with the escort of the persons was ambushed:

- The Serbian checkpoint was informed well in advance before the vehicles approached it;

- Taking into account the military defence system on the ground, the number and variety of armour observed and the short intervals with which they reacted, it is confirmed that the ambush was premeditated;

- The link between the capturing serbian parties: militia, police and army was observed the whole day long.

2. The Chief of Section and of the escort detachment team executed orders given to them and did not at any given moment give in to oppression thereby putting in danger the persons under their responsibility.

3. The proximity and threat of open of fire in all the above circumstances, the unfavorable use of force on a difficult ground not permitting manocuvreing would have been mistaken for a useless massacre.

Appendix VII

Report on the incident by Bosnia and Herzegovina Command

HQ BH COMMAND MAIN OFFICE OF CON

Page 1 of 5

[redacted] FLASH

[redacted]

[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	
[redacted]	

[redacted]

1. Attached is a copy of a fax from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia - Herzegovina sent at 1514 hrs on Saturday 06 Nov. An earlier request had been made by telephone.

2. Lengthy telephone discussions between the Ministry, HQ Command, and BSA Commander General Mladic ensued. General Mladic gave approval in principle but wished to know details of who the delegation consisted of. They were as follows:

a. Monsignor VINKO PULJIC.

b. Fra PETAR ANDJELOVIC.

c. Fra LJUBO LUCIC.

d. IVO TOMASEVIC.

e. PERUO DEJANOVIC - security.

f. JOZO ANDZIC - security.

/...

These details were given to BSA Major Indic at Lukavica, and confirmed through the UNMO link at Pale. A copy of the confirmation is attached. There was insufficient time to send the delegation on the date required, so all timings were deferred 24 hrs.

3. At 0800 hrs Monday 00 Nov, the delegation was collected from the Presidency by a FREBAT 2 convoy of 1 VBL and 2 VAB armoured personnel carriers, which move through the Moslem check points at KAZLOVAC at about 0830 hrs.

THE INCIDENT

4. As soon as the convoy arrived at the Serb check point at KAZLOVAC, it was blocked front and rear by Serb tanks. The Serb police at the check point insisted on arresting JOZO ANDZIC whom they accused of war crimes. The FREBAT 2 escort refused to let the Serbs into the vehicles and a lengthy stand-off began while negotiations were carried out at escalating levels by Chief Sector Sarajevo, COS HQ Command, CMO (Mr Andrew) and HQ UNPROFOR. Mr Andrew moved first to BUDOZOK and then to the PTT building in Sarajevo to continue negotiations at close hand, but senior Serb military personnel and politicians were not available. The Serb interlocutor (Ministry of Foreign Affairs official) insisted that the Serbs must arrest ANDZIC.

5. Further investigations with Mr MILIC (Deputy, adviser to the President of the Republic of Bosnia - Herzegovina) revealed that ANDZIC is the head of a Special Bosnian Police unit called "JATD" which has responsibilities for internal security under the control of the Ministry of the Interior. The task of this unit is apparently the maintenance of internal security within Sarajevo. This information was not told to UNPROFOR at the time of the initial request for the movement of the delegation. The Serbs have indicated that ANDZIC was trying to escape Sarajevo in an UNPROFOR APC.

6. Meanwhile on the ground the situation remained tense but at a stalemate throughout the day. At various times the APC's were threatened by Serb personnel and UNPROFOR armoured cars were placed in a readiness position at a discreet distance from the check point.

7. At 1630 hrs, the Serbs at the check point issued an ultimatum that ANDZIC be handed over or they would open fire on the detained UNPROFOR vehicles. This was refused and COS HQC ordered the reaction force to move up to the check point.

8. At about 1640 hrs a group of Serbs believed to be from the Ministry of the Interior, armed with crowbars, broke open the doors of the APC and dragged out two men (PERDO DEJANOVIC and JOZO ANDZIC) who were taken away, possibly to the barracks at ILIDZA.

9. All three APC's were released with the remainder of the four

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delegates. All returned to Sarajevo.

18. CCS BHC reported the situation to Vice President Dr. Ejub GANIC, who replied in well spoken english "You are responsible for what might happen to these people. You had enough time, you have aircraft. It is the full responsibility of your people to protect them". Later on BH Prime Minister Mr. SIJLADZIC called CAC Andreev and requested him to deal with this situation urgently.

COMMENT

19. The circumstances of this ambush are still not clear. In particular, it is not known who gave the orders for this kidnapping, nor to what degree the Serb army was involved.

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Attachment 1



Attachment II

Sector Sarajevo report on the incident

SECTEUR SARAJEVO
H.Q

LCL FEUTREN YVES
SMIO

SARAJEVO
LE 08 NOVEMBRE 1993

FICHE

Les deux "agents de sécurité" arrêtés par les serbes cet après-midi ne sont pas des policiers de petit calibre :

JOZO ANDZIC le chef de la force LASTVA et
FERDO DEJANOVIC le chef d'état-major du MUP.

- La force LASTVA "HIRONDELLE" est une unité autonome spéciale, d'environ 400 personnes, chargée de missions comme le nettoyage des 9 et 10ème brigades il y a quinze jours.
Elle travaille par commandos de 6 à 10 personnels, habillés de tenues sombres et cagoulés. La force disposerait d'un véhicule blindé style police armé de 12,7mm.
- La MUP constitue la police politique du régime, au nombre d'environ 300 personnels (anciens policiers et athlètes).

On peut se demander ce que faisaient ces deux personnages de haut rang dans la suite de l'archevêque : 3 hypothèses :

H1 - L'archevêque a été victime d'un chantage : voyage à VARES contre exfiltration des deux chefs.

H2 - Embuscade contre ces deux chefs d'origine croate de la part des bosniaques : en effet leurs noms figuraient sur la "clearance" demandée aux serbes.

H3 - Mission spéciale de ces deux chefs à VARES (ANDZIC est originaire de cette ville ou y aurait de la famille).

Si H3 s'avérait vrai, ce serait tout bénéfice pour les bosniaques, débarrassés de chefs croates encombrants, discréditant archevêque et UNPROFOR, tout cela sur le compte des serbes.

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Appendix VIII

UNPROFOR headquarters report on the incident

UNPROFOR

ROUTINE PRIORITY IMMEDIATE MOST IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED UN RESTRICTED UN CONFIDENTIAL UN SECRET ONLY

OUTGOING FAX NO.: C752	DATE: 08/11/93
TO: BOUTROS-GHALI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK	FROM: STOLTENBERG/ZAGREB
FAX NO.:	FAX NO.:
ATTN: BOUTROS-GHALI ANNAN GOULDING COT	FILE REF. NO.: DRAFTER: BRIG RITCHIE COS
INFO: FAX NO:	
SUBJECT: FORCIBLE REMOVAL BY BOSNIAN SERB FORCES OF TWO MUSLIMS FROM AN UNPROFOR VEHICLE	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SRSG, FC, HCA, DPC, COS, ACOS (O&P), PIO	

MESSAGE

A serious incident has taken place at a Bosnian Serb checkpoint at RAILOVAC North West of SARAJEVO where a delegation from SARAJEVO en route to VARES travelling in three FREBAT 2 armoured vehicles were blocked at 0830 hours 8 Nov by two Serbian tanks, one placed at either end of the convoy. After all day negotiations to release the convoy an ultimatum was given to hand over a member of the delegation, a Mr JOZO ANDZIC, or the Serbians would open fire.

Before the ultimatum expired, the Serbians forced open the rear door of one of the VABs, aimed their rifles at the French soldiers and dragged out Mr JOZO ANDZIC and Mr FERDO DEJTANOVIC. They are believed to have been taken to the nearby Serbian Barracks at RAILOVAC. All Serb forces have now withdrawn and the convoy has returned to Sarajevo.

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I was first made aware of this incident by Brigadier Ritchie who is Acting Force Commander at 1540 hours. This was within 5 minutes of his first learning of this incident from BH Command. I immediately telephoned President Milosovic to seek his good offices to release the convoy.

I was kept abreast of developments and at 1620 hours was told that the Serbs had forced entry into one of the VABs and removed the two men at gun point. Milosovic agreed to seek their early release.

At 1840 hours President Milosovic called back and informed me that one man had been released, that only one man was now kept under arrest, and that this man was a notorious war criminal who had travelled under false name.

What is quite clear is that this was a deliberate ambush on the UNPROFOR party as General Mladic had personally cleared the convoy on 7 November and knew precisely who was on board. The person they were after was Mr JOZO ANDZIC who is the head of a Special Police Unit of the BH Ministry of the Interior believed to be called LASTA.

The other members of the delegation were

Monsignor	MIKO	PULJIC
Father	PETAR	ANDJELOVIC
Father	LJUBO	LUCIC
Mr	IVO	TOMASEVIC

A full report will follow once all details have been clearly established.

UNITED
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General Assembly
Security Council

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GENERAL

A/48/593
S/26727
12 November 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Agenda item 79
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING
OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Letter dated 11 November 1993 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit the letter of His Excellency Dr. Radoje Kontic, Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to Mr. Cornelio Sommaruga, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 79, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIĆ
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

ANNEX

Letter dated 10 November 1993 from the Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross

Following the Geneva Treaty and the Budapest Agreement, the Yugoslav side has informed the International Committee of the Red Cross on several occasions of the lack of interest on the part of the Republic of Croatia in initiating and carrying out a POW exchange, search for missing persons, exhumation of human remains and in other humanitarian issues. We have requested the distinguished organization of ICRC to help us find solutions and influence the Republic of Croatia to address itself responsibly to the quest for solutions to these humanitarian issues. Unfortunately, there has been no evidence yet of Croatia's readiness and resolve to solve the humanitarian issues between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia.

For those reasons the situation in this regard is now very difficult. Despite immense efforts made by our side, we have not been able to make any progress with the Republic of Croatia in the last 15 months.

The Republic of Croatia continues to refuse to fulfil its commitments under the Geneva Treaty and the Budapest Agreement of 7 August 1992, providing for a comprehensive POW exchange. It stubbornly refuses to:

(a) Provide information to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia about 50 Yugoslav soldiers taken prisoner in the territory of Croatia who had a POW status and of whom every trace was subsequently lost. We fear that they may have experienced the fate that befell 220 of their colleagues who died in camps and prisons of the Republic of Croatia;

(b) Analyse and provide individual explanations for each person from the search list of the combatants of the former Yugoslav People's Army and the Territorial Defence from Serbian Krajinas in the former Socialist Republic of Croatia participating in armed conflicts in Croatia, who disappeared, were taken prisoner, were killed, died, crossed to the Croatian side or experienced a different fate. The list of those persons contains 1,000 names with all essential identification data;

(c) Make a comprehensive list of the remaining combatants and citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia taken prisoner whom it holds captive even after the Geneva Treaty and the Budapest Agreement. Unfortunately, the Croatian authorities keep those persons away from the eyes of ICRC so that they are not protected at all. The Yugoslav side is often informed of their names in an indirect way. Under the Geneva Treaty and the Budapest Agreement, those POWs should haver been set free long ago;

(d) Set free immediately, or collect and forward to the Yugoslav side the data on the pilot of the Yugoslav Air Force, Captain Slobodan Medić, whom the authorities of the Republic of Croatia did not bring for POW exchange after the signing of the Geneva Treaty and the Budapest Agreement.

Following the POW exchange under the said Treaty and Agreement, 11 Croatian commandos still remain in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. They were caught and sentenced for carrying out terrorist attacks in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was not and is not at war with the Republic of Croatia. These terrorists were given POW status by ICRC despite the repeated objections of the Yugoslav side that they were not POWs, but terrorists who had infiltrated the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was confirmed also by the legally valid sentence of a competent court. Even though the Yugoslav side had not agreed that those terrorists have POW status, it has tried for more than 15 months to exchange them under the proviso that its interests be satisfied as well.

Similarly, the Croatian side accuses the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia unjustly for the fate of many other POWs and 1,300 of its disappeared civilians and combatants, although search requests for 649 missing persons have been submitted under an agreement with the Croatian side and the ICRC under Geneva Conventions procedures, out of which 300 requests have been solved.

At the same time the Croatian side hides from the world that it expelled over 250,000 (according to the data of the Secretary-General of the United Nations) and over 300,000 (according to our data) Serbs from the territory of the former Socialist Republic of Croatia in the ethnic cleansing campaign.

You will recall that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia proposed to the Croatian side that a tripartite commission be set up (the third member would be ICRC) which, for the purpose of establishing confidence between the two countries would tour all places in Yugoslavia where, as alleged in a Croatian anti-Yugoslav campaign, are hidden POWs and disappeared persons. We also proposed that the results of the work of this commission be published. So far we have not requested that the commission undertake the same assignment on the Croatian side.

Although this proposal has been submitted and resubmitted for more than a year and a half, there has been no response from the Croatian side. It seems that it is much more important for Croatia to spread lies about Yugoslavia than to heal the wounds of war and to get to know the real truth about its POWs and disappeared civilians. In this way, it avoids telling its people openly the real price of the war it has provoked and it is still waging against the Serb people.

Furthermore, Croatia refuses to carry out the agreement reached between the Presidents of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia in October 1992, relating to the exchange of data on persons who committed war crimes and the obligation that those persons be tried in a court of law in countries of which they are nationals. Instead, Croatia has promoted some of the war criminals exchanged in the POW exchange, so that many of them now have higher ranks in the Croatian Army or occupy higher positions in the Government of Croatia.

The occasion and duty enjoin me to plead with you to use your authority and influence with the Republic of Croatia so that, after 15 months, it too begins to fulfil its international commitments without delay. In this context, your engagement in creating the necessary preconditions for the organization of a

meeting between delegations of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia at Geneva, under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross, would be very useful indeed. On our part, there is no impediment, whatsoever, to having such a meeting result in an agreement between two sides on the exchange of remaining POWs under the Geneva Treaty and the Budapest Agreement, and to find out and identify solutions also for other humanitarian issues, primarily those relating to the search for missing persons.

(Signed) Dr. Radoje KONTIC

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26728
12 November 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 11 NOVEMBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BELGIUM TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the French and English texts of the statement concerning Nagorny Karabakh adopted by the European Union on 9 November 1993.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Paul NOTERDAEME
Permanent Representative of Belgium
to the United Nations

Annex

[Original: English and French]

Brussels, 9 November 1993

STATEMENT ON NAGORNY KARABAKH

The European Union condemns the breach of the cease-fire agreement reached on 24 October 1993 in the region of Nagorny Karabakh and calls upon all forces to withdraw from the recently occupied territories. The European Union reiterates the importance it attaches to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Azerbaijan, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE.

The European Union is particularly concerned at the fate of tens of thousands of civilians who are fleeing the fighting. Receiving and protecting these refugees must be a priority for the international community. However, the presence of these refugees increases the risk of the conflict becoming an international one and threatens the stability of the whole region.

The European Union will continue its humanitarian aid to the affected population and would call upon all States in the region to facilitate the carrying of the aid.

The European Union reaffirms its total support for the efforts undertaken by the CSCE Minsk Group in order to find a lasting political solution to the conflict in Nagorny Karabakh. It prevails upon the parties to the conflict to renew the cease-fire broken on 24 October 1993.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26729
12 November 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 NOVEMBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to present to you the attached letter from the Presidency and the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, dated 9 November 1993.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating this letter and its attachment as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 9 November 1993 from the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council

On 9 July 1993 the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina put a request to the Security Council, UNESCO, and the Council of Europe to prevent the destruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar and dispatch, without any delay, a group of UNESCO experts that would ensure its protection.

The Old Bridge in Mostar has been obliterated. On this day, 9 November 1993, the Croatian Army and the Croatian Defense Council has destroyed the most significant monument of Bosnian-Herzegovinian culture. Since 1566 the Bridge, with its 20 metre high arch had linked the banks of one of Europe's most beautiful cities.

We expected that the civilized world would recognize in that jewel of architecture the irreplaceable beauty of history and spirit of an old European people and that the world would stop the destroyers.

One of the most beautiful historical bridges from the 16th century disappeared before the eyes of the world, as yet another terrible crime against culture in this century.

Together with the Old Bridge, the hope died, that humankind can protect itself from the abyss of crime where the Bosnian people and its culture have been thrown.

It is the last hour that those within the international community, who so stubbornly equalize the victim and the aggressor, to realize the difference between the aggression and fight for freedom, between savagery and civilization. If after this, the international community finally realizes the truth, then the disappearance of the Old Bridge was no completely in vain.

Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26730
12 November 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 8 NOVEMBER 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I wish to refer to paragraph 10 of resolution 872 of 5 October 1993, in which the Security Council welcomed my intention to appoint a Special Representative who would lead the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in the field and exercise authority over all its elements.

Following consultations, I have now decided to appoint Mr. Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, former Minister for External Relations of Cameroon, as my Special Representative for Rwanda, with immediate effect.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

93-63163 (E) 121193 141193

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26731
12 November 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 12 NOVEMBER 1993 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 8 November 1993 (S/26730) concerning the appointment of a Special Representative to lead the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council. They take note of the information contained in your letter.

(Signed) José Luis JESUS
President of the Security Council

93-63169 (E) 121193 141193